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Abstract: This paper examines how corporate governance and executive compensation affect 
bank capitalization strategies for an international sample of banks over the 2003-2011 period. 
‘Good’ corporate governance, which favors shareholder interests, is found to give rise to 
lower bank capitalization. Boards of intermediate size, separation of the CEO and chairman 
roles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions, n particular, lead to low bank 
capitalization. However, executive options and stock wealth invested in the bank is associated 
with better capitalization except just before the crisis in 2006. In that year stock options 
wealth was associated with lower capitalization which suggests that potential gains from 
taking on more bank risk outweighed the prospect of additional loss. Banks’ tendency to 
continue payouts to shareholders after experiencing negative income shocks are shown to 
reflect executive risk-taking incentives. 
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A failing bank can be defined as one that has insufficient capital. Bank capitalization 
strategies thus are crucial in determining the probability of bank failure at the individual- 
bank level and at the systemic level. Two key aspect  of bank capitalization strategies can be 
distinguished.  
First, a bank has to determine its average, target lev l of bank capital. This average 
level of bank capital corresponds to the bank’s expected level of capital before it is hit by any 
major negative shock that adversely impacts on bank c pital. A higher average level of 
capital should increase a bank’s chances of withstanding major income shocks. Confirming 
this, Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that higher leve s of pre-crisis capital increase a 
bank’s probability of survival during a banking crisis. Along similar lines, Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012) and Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2013) find that banks that were 
better capitalized before the crisis had a better sock market performance during the crisis. 
Second, a bank has to decide whether to cut its net payouts to bank stock investors 
after a negative income shock so as to preserve capital. A conservative bank would tend to 
reduce dividends and share repurchases and increase sh re issuance after experiencing major 
losses. Acharya, Gujral and Shin (2009), however, show that many of the world’s largest 
banks continued to pay significant dividends in the initial phase of the crisis in 2008 before 
the demise of Lehman, putting the banks at risk. 
Banks are subject to regulatory requirements in the form of minimum capital ratios 
and – depending on individual circumstances – restrictions on payouts to bank stock investors 
aiming to prevent capital shortfalls giving rise to bank failure. In practice, however, banks 
continue to enjoy considerable discretion in their capitalization policies. Using data for an 
international sample of banks, in this paper we empirically examine various aspects of 
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corporate governance structures and executive compensation schemes as potential  drivers of 
bank capitalization strategies over the period 2003-2 11. 
Corporate governance is the set of rules that resolv  the potential conflict between 
managers and shareholders.  For banks, value-maximizing shareholders are likely to favor 
risky capitalization strategies to the extent that ese maximize banks’ prospects for receiving 
generous bailouts in the event of failure. In the empirical work, we explore how bank 
capitalization strategies are affected by a range of corporate governance features related to 
board size and composition, and to whether or not the firm is protected by anti-take-over 
provisions. 
The relationship between board size and capitalization strategies is a priori 
ambiguous, as a larger board may be better able to represent shareholder interests because it 
is less easily captured by management, but on the other hand it may be less effective in 
promoting shareholder interests due to free rider problems within the board. Given the risk-
taking incentives of shareholders, board independence from management and, more 
specifically, a board not chaired by the CEO, are expected to lead to riskier capitalization 
strategies. In contrast, anti-takeover provisions are expected to lead to less risky capitalization 
strategies, as a weaker market for corporate control implies that management can more easily 
pursue capitalization strategies that do not maximize shareholder value. 
We also consider several executive compensation variables relating to the CEO’s 
overall yearly compensation and its composition. A priori, the impact of these compensation 
variables on the riskiness of bank capitalization strategies is uncertain. More risky strategies 
may increase the expected value of executive financial wealth and perhaps even of executive 
human capital, analogously to the expected positive effect on overall bank stock market 
valuation. This suggests that managers’ incentives o undertake risky capitalization strategies 
may increase with measures of their overall income, and of their financial wealth relative to 
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cash income as tied to the banks. However, executive income and wealth related to the bank 
are nondiversifiable, which may be why higher income and wealth associated with the bank 
may cause managers to pursue less risky bank capitalization strategies.  
For US banks only, we also construct two additional executive compensation 
variables that measure the impact of share price move ents, and increases in share price 
volatility, on executive wealth.  A high sensitivity of executive wealth to share price 
movements - or a high ‘delta’ – provides executives with the incentive to reduce the riskiness 
of bank capitalization strategies to reduce risk to their wealth, while a high positive impact of 
increased share price volatility on executive wealth – a high ‘vega’ - is likely to increase the 
riskiness of capitalization strategies. 
Turning to our main results, we find that ‘good’ corp rate governance – or corporate 
governance that causes the bank to act in the interests of bank shareholders – engenders lower 
levels of bank capital. Specifically, we find that bank boards of intermediate size (big enough 
to escape capture by management, but small enough t avoid free rider problems within the 
board), separation of the CEO and chairman of the board roles, and an absence of anti-
takeover provisions lead to lower capitalization rates. Our results thus suggest that ‘good’ 
corporate governance may be bad for bank stability and potentially entail high social costs.2  
 However, we do not find consistent evidence that corporate governance schemes that 
promote shareholder interests cause badly performing ba ks to continue relatively high 
payouts to shareholders. This may reflect that banks with ‘good’ corporate governance on 
average have relatively low capitalization rates, providing them no room to maintain 
relatively aggressive payout policies in the face of negative income shocks.  
 Regarding executive compensation, we find that capitalization rates increase with 
CEO overall compensation, and also with CEO options and stock wealth invested in the firm 
                                                           
2 Previously Laeven and Levine (2009) have shown that a high concentration of shareholders, which increases 
the comparative power of shareholders within corporate governance structures, increases bank risk taking.  
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relative to annual cash income during the overall 2003-2011 period. These results favor the 
interpretation that high executive income and wealth tied to the bank cause managers to 
increase capitalization so as to reduce the riskines of their income and wealth. However, 
executive options wealth is associated negatively with bank capitalization in 2006 just prior 
to the financial crisis, when apparently the potential gains from taking on more bank risk 
outweighed the prospect of additional loss. 
We find that executive options and shares wealth leads to a higher tendency for the 
bank to continue payouts to bank stock investors even if the bank performs badly, suggesting 
that higher executive wealth invested in the bank leads to riskier payout strategies. One 
explanation may be that executives fear that payout cuts could endanger their jobs or wealth 
(as the share price may drop on the news of lower payouts to shareholders), with these risks 
becoming more pronounced at higher levels of overall income and of wealth tied to the bank. 
For the case of US banks, we find that bank capitalization reflects the CEO’s risk-taking 
incentives as summarized by delta and vega.  
 By now a significant literature exists on how corporate governance affects banks.3 
Existing papers primarily focus on two main issues: (i) the impact of corporate governance on 
ex ante risk-taking by banks, and (ii) the implications of corporate governance on how banks 
fared during the crisis.  
 Regarding the first question, Pathan (2009) finds that small boards and boards not 
controlled by the CEO lead to additional bank risk a  reflected in market measures of risk and 
the Z-score for a sample of US bank holding companies over the 1997-2004 period. Chen, 
Steiner, and Whyte (2006), in turn, find a positive impact of option-based executive 
compensation on market measures of risk for a sample of US commercial banks during the 
period 1992-2000.  DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2010) further find that CEO risk-taking 
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 Recent surveys are offered by Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2011) and Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro (2012). 
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incentives lead to riskier business policy decision (concerning loans to businesses, non-
interest based banking activities, and investment in mortgage-backed securities) at US 
commercial banks over the 1994-2006 period. 
 Regarding the second issue, Berger, Bjorn, and Rauch (2012) find that high 
shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers imply a substantially lower probability of 
bank failure for US commercial banks over the 2007-2 10 period. Fahlenbrach  and Stulz 
(2011) find some evidence that US banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned 
with the interests of shareholders in 2006 had worse share price performance during the 
subsequent crisis. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) report that US bank holding companies that 
had strong internal risk controls in place before th  onset of the financial crisis fared better in 
terms of operating and stock performance during the crisis.  
 This study is also related to a significant literau e that addresses how corporate 
governance affects corporate payout policy (i.e., through dividends or share repurchases), 
without looking specifically at financial firms or the crisis period. Fenn and Liang (2001), for 
instance, find that managers that own stock options are more likely to initiate share 
repurchases (rather than pay dividends), as these tend to lead to better share price 
performance. Along similar lines, Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007) find that the 2003 
US dividend tax cut led to higher dividend payments (relative to share repurchases) in firms 
where executives have significant stock ownership. La Porta et al. (2000) find that firms pay 
higher dividends if located in countries with stronger minority shareholder rights. More 
general analyses of the evolution of dividends vs. share repurchases in the US and in Europe 
are offered by Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), and Von Eije, and Megginson 
(2008).  
 Several empirical papers have considered capitaliza ion rates of banks (Gropp and 
Heider, 2010; Keen and De Mooij, 2011), and the speed of adjustment towards a desired 
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capitalization rate (De Jonghe and Oztekin, 2012,) using international data. However, these 
papers have not considered corporate governance issu s. 
 At a theoretical level, Adams and Ferreira (2007) show that a management-dominated 
board may lead a firm to select better projects, as the dominant position of management 
enables it to reveal more information to non-management directors, thereby eliciting better 
advice from these directors without these directors being able to restrict management’s ability 
to select projects that are privately beneficial. Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2011) show that 
excess risk-taking by banks can be addressed by basing executive compensation on both the 
stock price and the bank’s CDS spread. The presence of d posit insurance and trusting debt 
holders, however, imply that it is not in shareholders’ interests to design compensation 
contracts in this way. Edams and Liu (2011) show that debt-like instruments such as pension 
rights are generally part of the optimal compensation package so as to contain the agency 
costs of debt. John, Saunders and Senbet (2000) demonstrate that the FDIC insurance 
premium can be made dependent on incentive features of top-management compensation to 
eliminate excess bank risk-taking. 
      To conclude, the contribution of our paper is two-fold.  First, we investigate the impact of 
both corporate governance and executive compensatio schemes on bank capitalization 
strategies for the first time for an international s mple of banks over the 2003-2011 period.  
Second, we are also able to investigate a potentially differential impact in 2006, just leading 
up to the international financial crisis. 
In the remainder, section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 presents the emp irical results. 
The section 3 starts with an analysis of the determinants of average, target levels of bank 
capitalization. Then it considers the determinants of payouts to bank shareholders, with a 
focus on badly performing banks. Finally, it considers the determinants of bank capitalization 
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levels only in the year 2006, just preceding the financial crisis that started in 2007. Finally, 
section 4 concludes. 
2. The data 
We combine data on banks’ capitalization ratios and payout behavior for an 
international sample of banks with data on key aspect  of their corporate governance and 
executive compensation schemes. Accounting data and m rket data necessary to construct 
our capitalization and payout variables are taken from Bankscope of Bureau Van Dijk and 
Worldscope of Thomson Financial. Data on corporate governance for an international sample 
of banks for the years 2004-2008 are taken from the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) 
data base assembled by Institutional Shareholder Services. Data on executive compensation 
internationally for the years 2003-2011 are from Compustat’s Capital IQ. Finally, data on 
additional compensation variables only for US banks for the 2003-2011period are available 
from Compustat’s ExecuComp. Table A1 in the Appendix provides all variable definitions 
and data sources and Table A2 reports country coverage.  
We consider the impact of corporate governance and of executive compensation on 
five alternative indices of bank capitalization. First, Tier 1 capital is a regulatory capital ratio 
constructed as Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets, where Tier 1 capital and risk-
weighted capital are calculated according to Basel rul s. Tier 1 capital includes common 
equity and perpetual, non-cumulative preferred equity, and it can be seen as a measure of the 
funds cumulatively contributed by common and preferr d shareholders that can be exhausted 
through losses while the bank remains a going concern. As seen in Table 1, the mean Tier 1 
capital ratio in our sample is 11.9%.  
Total capital is a broader regulatory capital ratio constructed as the sum of Tier 1 
capital and Tier 2 capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Tier 2 capital includes hybrid 
capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves, and v luation reserves. Subordinated debt can 
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only be used to offset a bank’s losses, after the bank has ceased to be a going concern. Thus, 
not all of Tier 2 capital can be considered to be a buffer to protect a bank from insolvency. 
The average Tier 2 capital ratio is 13.7%.  
 Common equity is a narrower measure of bank capitaliza ion constructed as common 
equity divided by total assets. This capitalization measure should be relevant to common 
shareholders, as it represents the capital that common shareholders have at stake.  Common 
shareholder interests should be important to a bank’s management and board, not least 
because common shareholders have voting rights. The denominator of the common equity 
ratio is total assets rather than risk-weighted assets, and hence insensitive to the potentially 
arbitrary and manipulable risk weighting of assets. The mean common equity ratio is 8.9%. 
 Common equity can be divided into tangible common equity and non-tangible 
common equity. The latter includes tax deferred assets, mortgage servicing rights, and 
minority interests in financial intermediaries. The loss absorption capacity of these various 
items is zero (as in the case of tax deferred assets) or limited (as in the case of mortgage 
servicing rights). To reflect this, we also consider the tangible equity ratio, constructed as 
tangible equity divided by tangible assets (i.e., total assets minus non-tangible assets). The 
tangible equity ratio has a mean of 7.9%.  
 Banks have some discretion over the book valuation of their assets and their capital. 
For this reason, capitalization measures based solely on accounting data may be misguided, 
especially during a time of economic and financial risis. Therefore, we consider an 
additional capitalization measure, called market value, that is constructed as the ratio of the 
market value of the bank’s common equity to a proxy f r the market value of a bank’s total 
assets (computed as the sum of the book value of total assets and the market value of 
common equity minus the book value of common equity). This market-based measure of 
bank capitalization should be more accurate than corresponding accounting-based measures 
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to the extent that bank stock investors are aware of distortions in the accounting valuation of 
bank assets. However, the market-based capital ratio c n only be an imperfect measure of 
bank capitalization, as it also reflects the valuation of a bank’s access to the financial safety 
net. Banks that are too big to fail, in particular, may have a higher market valuation  than 
justified purely on the basis of extant bank capital, as they can count of being bailed out in 
case of financial distress. The average market value ratio is 12.2%. 
 Figures 1 through 5 provide information on the development of our 5 bank 
capitalization measure over the 2003-2011 period.  Figures 1 and 2 show that the two 
regulatory capital measures, Tier 1 capital and Total capital, declined from 2004 to 2008, 
followed by significant increases afterwards to levels even higher than before the crisis. 
Figures 3 and 4 show that the Common equity ratio and the Tangible equity ratio declined 
during the crisis till 2009 and 2008, respectively, with relatively modest subsequent 
recoveries. Together these four pictures suggest that he increases in the regulatory ratios 
during 2009-2011 reflect a downward adjustment of the average risk-weighting of assets in 
addition to a decline in the leverage ratios based on common and tangible equity.  
Figure 5, in turn, provides the time trend of the market value ratio. Interestingly, the 
time paths of the common equity ratio in Figure 3 and the market value ratio in Figure 5 look 
very similar until 2010, while they diverged in 2011: the uptick in the common equity ratio in 
2011 is not followed by a corresponding increase in the market value ratio. This suggests that 
changes in the common equity ratio corresponded rathe  well with shareholders’ perception 
of bank market value changes until 2010, but not in 2011. The discrepancy between Figures 1 
and 2 on the one hand and Figure 5 on the other further suggests that the strong recoveries of 
the regulatory capital ratios as seen in Figures 1 and 2 after 2008 are purely accounting-
based, as there is no correspondingly strong recovery in the market value ratio. 
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 We also consider four measures of payouts to bank shareholders: (i) dividends, (ii) 
share repurchases, (iii) the sum of dividends and share repurchases, denoted payout, and (iv) 
the sum of dividends and share repurchases minus share issuance to private shareholders, 
denoted net payout.4 Corresponding to these four payout measures, we construct four dummy 
variables signalling whether or not a particular payout measure is positive. The Dividends 
dummy variable, for instance, signals whether or not a bank pays dividends. As seen in Table 
1, 83.6% of the banks pay dividends in any given year; 58.3% of banks repurchase shares; 
88.4% have a positive gross payout; and 75.6% have a positive net payout. 
 In addition, we consider four payout variables reflecting the funds returned to 
shareholders relative to total assets. Thus, the Dividends to assets variable is the ratio of 
dividends to total assets with a mean of 0.34%. The Repurchases to assets ratio, in turn, has a 
mean of 0.25%. The mean total payout to assets ratio is 0.60%, while the mean net payout to 
assets ratio is 0.48% (where this variable is truncated at zero). 
 Figures 6-9 display the time trends of the four payout variables as related to total 
assets over the 2003-2011 period. The Dividends to a sets ratio is seen to increase until 2006, 
and to decline strongly afterwards, with a modest rcovery in 2011. The Repurchases to 
assets ratio instead peaked in 2007, declined in 2008, and then stayed relatively low during 
2009-2010 to increase again in 2011. The time path of e total payout to assets ratio also 
peaked in 2007, followed by declines until 2010 and recovery in 2011. The net payout to 
assets ratio, finally, peaked in 2007, and then declined until 2009, to increase again in 2010 
and 2011. 
 Our corporate governance variables concern the size and composition of the bank’s 
board and anti-takeover provisions as an index of the effectiveness of the market for 
                                                           
4 The total payout variable abstracts from the choice between dividends and repurchases. Jagannathan, Stephens, 
and Weisbach (2000) find that dividends are paid by firms with ‘permanent’ operating cash flows, while 
repurchases are used by firms with ‘temporary’, non-operating cash flows. See Denis and Osobov (2008) and 




corporate control. To start, Board independence is an indicator of the share of independent 
directors in the board; this variable ranges from 1 to 6, with a higher score indicating a higher 
share of independent directors. A more independent board is expected to better represent the 
interests of shareholders rather than of management. A more independent board, therefore, is 
hypothesized to favour more bank risk taking, which would serve to increase the valuation of 
the bank’s contingent claim on the financial safety net as reflected in bank share prices. Bank 
risk taking, in contrast, may be relatively less favoured by bank managers, as they could lose 
their jobs in case of a bank failure. A more independent board could bring on more bank risk 
by condoning lower capitalization rates and by approving continued payouts to bank 
shareholders of badly performing banks. 
 Next, Board size is an indicator of the number of b ard members; this variable ranges 
from 1 to 5, with a higher score representing a larger board. A very small board may find it 
difficult to stand up to management, as the burden of doing so would fall on very few board 
members. A very large board may similarly be unable to ffectively oppose management, as 
it could be subject to free-rider problems among its many members. This suggests that board 
effectiveness – in promoting shareholder interests - may be related to board size in a 
nonlinear fashion, with boards of intermediate size being the most effective. Boards of 
intermediate size thus may favour relatively risky bank capitalization strategies. To test for 
the possibly nonlinear relationship between board size and the riskiness of bank capitalization 
strategies, we include linear as well as squared board size variables in some specifications. 
 Alternatively, Board size, effective is a variable that takes a higher value if the 
headcount of board members is taken to imply a board that more effectively represents 
shareholder interests; this variable ranges from 1 to 3, with a higher score representing a more 
effective board. The highest score of 3 is given to a board with an intermediate number of 
board members between 9 and 12. 
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 Next, the CEO chairman separation variables indicates the degree to which the roles 
of CEO and chairman of the board are separated; the CEO chairman separation variable 
ranges from 1 to 3, with a higher score indicating better separation between the two roles. 
Effective separation of the CEO and chairman roles should enable a board to better promote 
the interests of shareholders giving rise to riskier capital-related bank strategies. 
 As a final corporate governance variable, the Anti-takeover provision variable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the bank is incorporated in a country or state that allows a 
bank to adopt anti-takeover provisions. Such measurs weaken the disciplining effect of the 
market for corporate control on bank management, possibly enabling managers to pursue less 
risky bank capitalization strategies. Consistent with this, Low (2009) found that an increase 
in take-over protection in Delaware in the mid-1990s caused managers to lower firm risk. 
 For an international sample of banks, we have information on CEO annual 
compensation packages and on this executive’s ownership of options and shares from Capital 
IQ. To start, CEO total compensation is defined as the logarithm of overall annual 
compensation granted to the CEO. This variable represents options and shares granted as well 
as cash compensation, with a priori ambiguous implications for risk taking. In addition, we 
construct three variables that represent the significa ce of executive option and share 
ownership relative to annual cash compensation. To wit, CEO options is the logarithm of the 
value of options cumulatively granted to the CEO relative to current cash compensation. The 
impact of CEO options wealth on the CEO’s incentive o take risk is a priori uncertain. 
Significant nondiversifiable options wealth may lead the CEO to pursue less risky banking 
strategies so as to preserve his wealth, especially if the options are deep in the money. 
Options wealth, conversely, may induce higher risk taking, as the value of options increases 
in share price volatility, especially if the exercise price is close to the share price.  
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 As an analogous variable, we construct CEO shares as the logarithm of the value of 
the shares cumulatively granted to the CEO relative to this cash compensation. Significant 
share ownership may lead the CEO to become more conservative to reduce the risk to his 
wealth. On the other hand, share ownership may induce additional risk taking as a bank’s 
valuation may increase with bank risk, especially if the valuation of the bank is close to zero. 
 Next, the CEO portfolio variable represents the CEO’s combined options and share 
wealth. Specifically, it is the logarithm of the value of the CEO’s options and shares relative 
to cash compensation. The impact of CEO portfolio on bank risk taking is a priori again 
ambiguous.  
 The valuation data on executive option and stock wealth available from Capital IQ do 
not include details on exactly what options or shares are held. Hence, this information is too 
crude to compute executive risk taking incentives byond those implicit in overall valuations. 
For US banks, more detailed information about executive options and stock packages is 
available from ExecuComp. For US banks only, therefore, we can measure executive risk 
taking incentives more precisely, as proxied by variables that indicate the impact of share 
price movements and increases in share price volatility on executive wealth. To wit, the CEO 
delta variable is the logarithm of the CEO’s delta, defined as the dollar value change of the 
CEO’s stock and option portfolio when the stock price increases by 1%. A high CEO delta 
suggests that the CEO has a lot of wealth at stake in the bank, and hence that the CEO will be 
inclined to take less risk.  
Furthermore, CEO vega stands for the logarithm of the CEO’s vega, defined as the 
dollar value change of a CEO’s stock and options portfolio when the stock price volatility 
increases by 1%. A high CEO vega indicates that the CEO’s wealth increases considerably 
with increased share price risk, and hence it suggests that the CEO will be inclined to take 
more risk.  
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In our capitalization regressions, we use two bank-level control variables. First, 
Assets is the log of a bank’s total assets. Second, return on assets is a bank’s pre-tax profits 
divided by total assets, with a mean value of 0.65% 
Finally, to proxy for negative bank income shocks we define the Income shock 
variable as minus the change in a bank’s return on assets provided that it is in the lower 
quintile of the change in the rate of return on assets distribution; the Income shock variable is 
instead set to zero, if the change in the rate of rturn on assets is in the upper four quintiles of 
its distribution. The mean Income shock is 1.8%. Figure 10 shows the fraction of banks 
experiencing negative income shocks in any given year. As expected, the highest fractions of 
banks experiencing negative income shocks are seen during the crisis years since 2007. 
3. Empirical results 
 This section presents empirical results of  the impact of corporate governance and 
executive compensation on bank capitalization strategies. Subsection 3.1 focuses on bank 
capitalization ratios, while subsection 3.2 considers payouts of badly performing banks to 
bank stock investors. Subsection 3.3 considers bankc pitalization ratios only for the year 
2006, just prior to the recent financial crisis. 
  
3.1 Results on bank capitalization ratios 
Table 2 shows the results of regressions that relate b nk capitalization variables to 
corporate governance variables. The regressions include two bank-level control variables. 
First, the assets variable proxying for bank size is xpected to obtain negative coefficients, as 
large banks have an incentive to exploit their too-big-to-fail status by maintaining low 
capitalization ratios. Second, the return to assets variable is expected to enter the regressions 
positively, as more profitable banks can more easily add to their capital buffers by retaining 
earnings (and not taking losses). All explanatory variables are lagged one period to reduce the 
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potential for reverse causation.5 Regressions include country/year fixed effects to control for 
time-varying, country-level determinants of capitaliz tion rates such as the state of the 
business cycle. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. 
Panel A shows the results of five capitalization regressions that include the board 
independence variable. This variable enters regressions for the four capitalization ratios 
purely based on accounting information (i.e., Tier 1 capital, Total capital, Common equity, 
Tangible equity) in columns 1-4 with negative and isignificant coefficients, while it enters 
the Market value regression in column 5 with a positive and insignificant coefficient. 
In Panel B, the board size variable enters the Total capital regression in column 2 with 
a negative coefficient that is significant at 10%, possibly reflecting that a larger board better 
represents shareholder interests as served by a lower capitalization. The board size variable, 
in turn, enters the Market value regression in column 5 with a positive coefficient that is 
significant at 5%. A larger board thus appears to create market value for shareholders, 
perhaps precisely because it reduces a capitalization ratio such as the Total capital ratio. 
In Panel C, the Board size, effective variable enters the Common equity and Tangible 
equity regressions in columns 3 and 4 with negative coefficients that are significant at the 1% 
level. Thus, boards of intermediate size appear to reduce capital ratios relative to unweighted 
assets, while they have no significant impact on the regulatory capital ratios relative to 
weighted assets in columns 1 and 2. These results together suggest that banks with an 
‘effective’ board size are highly leveraged, while th y invest in assets with low or no risk 
weighting such as government bonds to keep up their regulatory capital ratios. 
The capitalization regressions in Panel D include lin ar and squared terms in the 
Board size variable to further investigate whether board size has a nonlinear impact on bank 
capital ratios. The linear board size variable is seen to obtain negative and significant 
                                                           
5 Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) find that country characteristics are much more important in explaining firm-
level variations in governance ratings than observable firm characteristics. This is consistent with lmited, if any, 
reverse causation from bank capitalization to bank corporate governance. 
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coefficients in the Common equity and Tangible capital regressions in columns 3 and 4, 
while the squared board size variable obtains positive and significant coefficients in these 
regressions. This is additional evidence that boards of intermediate size tend to reduce bank 
capital relative to unweighted assets, thereby increasing leverage as based on common and 
tangible equity. 
In Panel E, the CEO chairman separation variable obtains a negative coefficient that is 
significant at 10% in the Tangible capital regression 4, providing some evidence that a board 
that is not dominated by the CEO can pursue a low-capitalization strategy in the interest of 
shareholders. 
Finally, in Panel F the Anti-takeover provision variable obtains positive and 
significant coefficients in columns 1-3, while it obtains a negative and significant coefficient 
in the market value regression in column 5. Anti-takeover protection apparently enables 
management to pursue high-capitalization strategies as reflected in accounting-based capital 
ratios. This makes managers’ jobs and wealth invested in the firm safer. Anti-takeover 
protection, however, reduces the market-based capitalization rate in column 5 with 
significance at 10%, perhaps precisely because high accounting-based capitalization reduces 
bank valuation. 
Overall, the evidence of Table 2 suggests that boards o  intermediate or larger size, 
separation of the CEO and chairman roles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions lead to 
lower accounting-based capitalization ratios  - as would be favoured by shareholders -, while 
a larger board and a lack of anti-takeover provision  appear to increase market-based 
capitalization.  
Table 3 shows results of capitalization regressions that include executive 
compensation variables analogously to Table 2. The five regressions in Panel A that include 
the CEO total compensation variable yield insignificant coefficients for this variable, perhaps 
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reflecting that the various components of total compensation can affect capital ratios in 
opposite directions.  
Next, in Panel B the CEO options variable obtains po itive and significant 
coefficients in the Common equity and Market value regressions in columns 3 and 5.6 This 
suggests that CEOs with significant options wealth opt for high capitalization rates to reduce 
risk to their wealth.  
The CEO shares variable, in turn, enters the capitaliza ion regressions in columns 1-4 
of Panel C with positive coefficients that are stati ically significant. CEOs with significant 
CEO stock wealth appear to opt for higher capitalization rates so as to safeguard their wealth. 
Similarly, in Panel D we find that CEO portfolio vari ble, combing options and stock wealth, 
receives positive and significant coefficients in columns 1 and 3-5. Overall these results 
suggest that a CEO with significant options and stock wealth invested in a bank brings about 
higher capitalization rates to safeguard his wealth.7 
Next, we consider capitalization regressions that include information on executive 
risk-taking incentives, as summarized by delta and vega, for US banks only. A higher delta 
signals that executive wealth is more sensitive to bank share price movements, which is 
expected to reduce bank risk-taking in the form of low capitalization rates. In contrast, vega 
measures the increase in executive wealth following a higher share price volatility. Vega 
should be a good proxy for an executive’s incentive to take on more risk, and hence is 
expected to be associated with more bank risk taking. 
In Table 4, CEO delta is estimated with positive and significant coefficients in the 
tangible equity and market value regressions 4 and 5, suggesting that a CEO with significant 
                                                           
6
 Previously Houston and James (1995) found positive relationships between equity-based measures of CEO 
compensation and the bank’s market-to-book value tak n to be consistent with the hypothesis that compensation 
policies promote risk taking in banking. 
7
 In analogous fashion we considered the impact of CFO compensation on bank capitalization rates finding 
similar results. Specifically, we do not find that c pitalization rates are significantly related to CFO total 
compensation, while  in some specifications they ar positively and significantly related to CFO options wealth, 
CFO shares wealth, and to the sum of these (unreported). 
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wealth at stake in his bank increases its capitalization.8 The CEO vega variable, in turn, 
obtains negative and significant coefficients in the same two regressions, indicating that the 
CEO acts on his incentive to create share price risk by lowering capitalization ratios. Overall, 
bank capitalization is found to respond to bank ristaking incentives as summarized by delta 
and vega.9 
  
3.2 Results on payouts to bank stock investors 
 In this subsection, we consider the impact of corporate governance and executive 
compensation on a bank’s decision whether or not to continue channelling funds to 
shareholders in the face of negative income shocks.10 We consider four alternative measures 
of payments to shareholders: dividends, share repurchases, the sum of these two, and the net 
payout defined as the sum of dividends and share repurchases minus share issuance to private 
investors. In the regressions, we examine the determination of four dummy variables 
signalling whether the corresponding payout measure i  positive, and also four variables 
calculated as the corresponding payout relative to a bank’s total assets. 
 To proxy for negative bank income shocks, we define the Income shock variable as 
minus the change in a bank’s return on assets provided that it is in the lower quintile of the 
change in the return on assets distribution (while t e Income shock variable is set to zero 
otherwise). We are particularly interested in which corporate governance and executive 
compensation features lead a bank to continue payouts t  shareholders even after a negative 
income shock, thereby depleting bank capital further. To test this, the regressions include an 
                                                           
8
 Chava and Purnanandam (2010) have studied the impact of executive  risk-taking incentives on corporate 
policies for US firms generally finding that CEO’s ri k-decreasing incentives are associated with lower 
leverage. 
9
 In analogous regressions, we do not find that bank c pitalization rates are significantly related to CFO delta or 
CFO vega, which suggests that the CEO is more influe tial in determining bank capitalization rates than the 
CFO (unreported). 
10
 A bank that is slow to reduce payments to shareholders in the face of negative income shocks can only slowly 
adjust its capital ratios towards target levels provided that it does not fail. See Byoun (2008), Huang d Ritter 
(2006), and Oztekin and Flannery (2012) for empirical analyses of how firms dynamically adjust their capital 
structures towards targets. 
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interaction term of the Income shock variable and a particular corporate governance or 
executive compensation feature. A positive estimated coefficient for such an interaction term 
implies that the included corporate governance or executive compensation variable leads the 
bank to continuing payouts to shareholders after a negative income shock, further weakening 
the bank. A positive coefficient for any such interaction term thus means that the included 
corporate governance or executive compensation aspect facilitates a risky bank payout 
strategy. 
We estimate probit models to explain variation in the payout dummy variables, while 
we use tobit models to explain payouts relative to assets. Both probit and tobit models include 
country/year fixed effects, and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. 
 Table 5 reports the results of payout regressions that include a corporate governance 
feature. In the dividend dummy regression 1 of Panel A, the interaction of the Board 
independence variable and the income shock variable obtains a positive coefficient that is 
significant at 5%, supporting the hypothesis that independent boards serve the interests of 
shareholders by continuing to pay dividends in the fac  of negative income shocks.  
In the repurchase dummy regression 2 of Panel B, the interaction term of the Board 
size and income shock variables obtains a negative coefficient that is significant at 10%. 
Thus, larger boards appear to act conservatively by stopping share repurchases in the face of 
negative shocks, possibly serving the interests of management rather than shareholders. The 
board size variable, however, is estimated to be insignificant in the payout to assets 
regressions in columns 5-8, suggesting that larger boa ds do not significantly adjust payout 
size after negative shocks. 
Next, ‘effective’ boards are estimated to discontinue dividend payments after 
experiencing a negative income shock in the dividend dummy regression 1 of Panel C, while 
there is no significant impact on the volume of divi ends relative to assets in regression 5. 
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Effective boards thus reduce the likelihood of diviend payments after a negative shock, 
without a corresponding reduction in the volume of dividends given that a dividend payment 
occurs.  
Regression 7 of Panel D shows that total payouts relativ  to assets are positively and 
negative related to the interaction of board size and the income shock and the interaction of 
the squared board size and the income shock, respectively. This suggests that boards of 
intermediate size maintain higher total payouts to assets after experiencing losses.  
Next, the positive and significant coefficient of fr the CEO chairman separation 
variable in the dividend dummy regression 1 of Panel F suggests that such a separation 
facilitates the continuation of dividends after a negative income shock. However, the CEO 
chairman separation variable enters the total payments to assets regression in column 8 with a 
negative coefficient that is significant at 10%. 
Finally, Panel F does not show a significant impact of anti-takeover provisions on 
payouts to bank shareholders following negative income shocks. 
Overall, Table 5 shows inconclusive evidence on howc rporate governance features 
conducive to promoting shareholder interests affect the continuation of payouts in the face of 
negative shocks. This could reflect that banks with corporate governance schemes favoring 
shareholder interests maintain lower capitalization rates on average as shown in Table 2, 
providing them with little room to continue payouts relatively aggressively in the face of 
negative income shocks. 
 Next, in Table 6 we consider how the payouts to share olders of badly performing 
banks are related to executive compensation. Starting w th CEO total compensation in Panel 
A, we see that the interaction of this variable with the income shock variable obtains positive 
and significant coefficients in the dividends dummy, total payout dummy and net payout 
dummy regressions in columns 1, 3 and 4, suggesting that CEOs with high total 
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compensation keep up payouts to shareholders in the face of negative bank income shocks. 
The interaction of the CEO options variable and the income shock variable, in turn, is 
positively related to the payout variables in all 8 regressions in Panel B, while coefficients are 
statistically significant in 7 of these regressions. A CEO with considerable options wealth 
may be interested in continuing payouts to shareholders even if the bank performs badly, as 
this makes the bank stock more risky, possibly increasing option valuation. Alternatively, the 
CEO wants to keep up payouts, as lower payouts are interpreted as negative news by 
investors, possibly causing a decline in share as well as option valuation. 
 In Panel C, we see that the interaction of the CEO shares variable with the income 
shock variable is estimated with a positive and significant coefficient in the total payout 
dummy regression 3. Similarly, the interaction of the CEO portfolio variable and the income 
shock variable obtains coefficients that are positive and significant in the total payout and net 
payout dummy regressions 3-4 in Panel D. Overall, these results suggest that considerable 
CEO wealth invested in a bank leads the CEO to maintain payouts to shareholders in the face 
of negative income shocks.11  
Combining the findings from Tables 3 and 6, we see that higher CEO wealth invested 
in the bank engenders higher capitalization rates and at the same time the maintenance of 
payouts to investors after negative income shocks. These two implications of higher CEO 
wealth invested in the bank have apparent opposite implications for bank risk. However, 
these findings can be reconciled by noting that a bank with a higher capitalization rate is able 
to maintain payouts to bank stock investors longer while performing badly. 
  
 
                                                           
11 In regressions analogous to Table 6, we find that capitalization rates are positively and significantly related to 
CFO total compensation and to CFO total portfolio wealth (but not to its individual options and shares 
components ) (unreported).  These results suggest that he CEO is relatively important in determining bank 
payout policies in the face of negative income shocks. 
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3.3 Results on bank capitalization ratios in 2006 
In this section, we present evidence on capitalization rates for 2006 only. By 2006, 
banks have had several years to recover from any higher-than-average losses incurred 
following the worldwide recession at the beginning of the millennium. Thus, by 2006 most 
banks should have been able to get close to their ‘optimal’ capital ratios, no longer tainted by 
the previous large economic downturn. In addition, 2006 is an interesting year to consider, as 
it just precedes the recent financial crisis which started in 2007. Thus, information on bank 
capitalization strategies in 2006 tells us which banks chose to be prepared for a large 
financial crisis like the recent one. 
 Table 7 relates capitalization rates in 2006 to corporate governance features, 
analogously to Table 2. In Panel B, the board size variable is positive and significant in the 
Common equity regression in column 3 and in the Market value regression in column 5. The 
coefficient for this variable, instead, is estimated o be negative and insignificant in the Total 
capital regression in column 2 (while it is significant in the corresponding regression in Table 
2). The apparent ambiguity of the impact of board size on capitalization may reflect the 
inherent nonlinearity of the relationship. The results in Panels C and D of Table 8 are very 
similar to the corresponding results in Table 2, suggesting that boards of intermediate size 
lead to lower capitalization levels. In Panel E, the CEO chairman separation variable obtains 
negative and significant coefficients in the Common equity, Tangible capital and Market 
value regressions in columns 3-5, providing evidence that a board not dominated by the 
chairman contributed to low capitalization rates in 2006 prior to the recent crisis. Finally, 
Panel F of Table 7 shows that anti-takeover provisin  are positively and significantly related 
to regulatory capital ratios in columns 1 and 2, as such provisions enable managers to 
maintain higher capital ratios than consistent with maximizing shareholder value. 
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 Overall, the results of Table 7 indicate that corporate governance features favourable 
to shareholders (in particular, boards of intermediate size, CEO-chairman separation, and an 
absence of anti-takeover provisions) were associated with lower bank capitalization rates in 
2006, just prior to the recent financial crisis. 
 Table 8 relates capitalization ratios in 2006 to international executive compensation 
variables. In Panel A, we see that CEO total compensation is positively and significantly 
related to the market value ratio in column 5, indicating that CEO compensation contributed 
to market-based capitalization in that year. In Panel B, the CEO options variable is estimated 
with negative and significant coefficients in the regulatory capital ratio regressions in 
columns 1 and 2, while this variable contributes poitively and significantly to the market 
value ratio in column 5.12 Apparently, CEO options wealth was effective in reducing 
regulatory capital ratios and in increasing the market valuation of bank capital in 2006.  
The negative and significant estimated coefficients for the CEO options variable in 
columns 1 and 2 of Panel B (based on 2006 data) are in contrast to the insignificant 
coefficients in the corresponding columns in  Panel B of Table 3 and the positive and 
significant coefficients in columns 3 and 5 in this panel (based on 2003-2011 data). On 
average as based on a longer time period, higher CEO options wealth invested in the bank 
thus appears to lead to higher capital ratios but not in the year 2006, which exceptionally 
preceded a major banking crisis.13 
 
 
                                                           
12
 Analogously, we find that the CFO options variable obtains negative coefficients of -0.002 in the two 
regulatory capital ratio regressions that are significant at 10%, while it obtains a positive coefficient of 0.004 
that is significant at 1% in the market-based capitalization regression (unreported). These results suggest that 
CFO options wealth had a similar but smaller negative impact on regulatory bank capital ratios in 2006. 
13
 In robustness checks we estimated the regressions of Panel B of Table 8 for each year over the 2003-2011 
period.  These regressions show that 2006 was the only year when the CEO options variable was negatively and 
significantly related to regulatory capital ratios (unreported). This variable in contrast in positively and 
significantly related to all five capital ratios apart from the Tier 1 capital ratio in 2009, indicating that CEO 




For an international sample of banks over the 2003-2 11 period, we find that ‘good’ 
corporate governance – or corporate governance that causes the bank to act in the interests of 
bank shareholders – engenders lower levels of bank c pital. Specifically, we find that bank 
boards of intermediate size (big enough to escape cture by management, but small enough 
to avoid free rider problems within the board), separation of the CEO and chairman of the 
board roles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions lead to lower capitalization rates. 
‘Good’ corporate governance thus may be bad for bank stability and potentially entail high 
social costs. This disadvantage of ‘good’ corporate governance has be balanced with 
presumed benefits in terms of restricting management’s ability to perform less badly in other 
areas – for instance, by shirking or acquiring perks – at the expense of bank shareholders.   
However, we do not find consistent evidence that corporate governance schemes that 
promote shareholder interests cause badly performing ba ks to continue relatively high 
payouts to shareholders. This may reflect that banks with ‘good’ corporate governance on 
average have relatively low capitalization rates, providing them no room to maintain 
relatively aggressive payout policies in the face of negative income shocks.  
 Further, we find that capitalization rates increase with CEO overall compensation, and 
also with CEO options and stock wealth invested in the firm relative to annual cash income 
when considering the entire sample period from 2003 to 2011. These results favor the 
interpretation that high executive income and wealth tied to the bank cause managers to 
increase capitalization so as to reduce the riskines of their income and wealth. However, 
executive options wealth is associated negatively with bank capitalization in 2006 prior to the 
financial crisiswhen apparently the potential gains from taking on more bank risk outweighed 
the prospect of additional loss. 
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 We find that our executive options and shares wealth lead to a higher tendency for the 
bank to continue payouts to bank stock investors even if the bank performs badly, suggesting 
that higher executive wealth invested in the bank lead to riskier payout strategies. This may 
be because executives fear that payout cuts could endanger their jobs or wealth (as the share 
price may drop on the news of lower payouts to shareholders), with these risks becoming 
more pronounced at higher levels of overall income and of wealth tied to the bank. For the 
case of US banks, we find that bank capitalization only reflects the CEO’s risk-taking 
incentives as summarized by delta and vega.  
 Our findings have important policy implications. In reform discussions since the 
crisis, the potentially nefarious impact of ‘good’ governance on bank risk-taking often fails to 
be recognized. The European Commission (2010, p. 6), for instance, states that the board of 
directors were unable to exercise effective control over senior management and that directors’ 
failure to identify, understand and ultimately contr l he risks to which their financial 
institutions were exposed was at the heart of the origins of the crisis.  
The UK Parliamentary Commission on Banking (2013, p. 40 and p. 42) similarly 
concludes that many non-executive directors failed to act as an effective check on, and 
challenge to, executive managers, recommending the appointment of a Senior Independent 
Director ensuring that the relationship between the CEO and the Chairman does not become 
too close and that the Chairman performs his or her leadership and challenge role. This 
proposed change in the corporate governance of banks potentially increases bank risk-taking 
as long as boards act on the principle of shareholdr primacy (section 172 of the Companies 
Act of 2006). However, the UK Parliamentary Commission (2013, p. 42) simultaneously 
recommends to remove shareholder primacy with respect to banks, requiring directors of 
banks to ensure the financial safety and soundness of the company ahead of the interests of its 
members. These policy assessments ignore that more effective boards and good corporate 
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governance practices may well increase bank risk taking beyond the level preferred by senior 
management and they suggest first and foremost that reforms need to address policies that 
distort risk-taking incentives of shareholders, such as too-big-to-fail policies and government 
guarantees. 
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Table A1. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Tier 1 capital Ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets  WorldScope 
Total capital Ratio of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capit l to risk-weighted assets WorldScope 
Common equity Ratio of common equity to total assets WorldScope 
Tangible capital  Ratio of tangible capital to tangible assets BankScope 
Market value  Market value of common equity divided by total assets plus market value of common equity m nus book value of 
common equity 
WorldScope 
Dividends Dummy variable that equals one if the bank pays dividends, and zero otherwise WorldScope 
Repurchases Dummy variable that equals one if the bank repurchases common shares, and zero otherwise WorldScope 
Payout Dummy variable that equals one if the bank has a positive payout in terms of dividends and repurchases of 
common shares, and zero otherwise 
WorldScope 
Net payout Dummy variable that equals one if the bank has a positive payout in terms of dividends and repurchase of common 
shares net of common share issuance, and zero otherwise 
WorldScope 
Dividends to assets Ratio of dividends to total assets WorldScope 
Repurchases to assets Ratio of repurchases of common shares to total assets WorldScope 
Payout to assets Ratio of sum of dividends and purchases of common shares to total assets WorldScope 
Net payout to assets Ratio of sum of dividends and repurchase of common shares net of common share issuance to assets if positive, 
and zero otherwise 
WorldScope 
Board independence Variable ranging from 1 to 6, with a higher value indicating a more independent board ISS CGQ 
Board size Variable ranging from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating a larger board membership. Specifically, board size = 
1 if board membership < 6; board size = 2 if board membership  ≥ 6 and ≤ 8; board size = 3 if board membership  
≥ 9 and ≤ 12; board size = 4 if board membership ≥ 13 and ≤ 15; board size = 5 if board membership > 15 
ISS CGQ 
Board size, effective Variable ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating a more effective number of board members. 
Specifically board size, effective = 1 if board membership is < 6 or board membership > 15; board size, eff ctive = 
2 if board membership ≥ 6 and ≤ 8 or board membership ≥ 13 and ≤ 15; board size, effective = 3 if board 
membership ≥ 9 and ≤ 12. 
ISS CGQ 
CEO chairman separation Variable ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating better separation between the roles of CEO and 
chairman 
ISS CGQ 
Anti-takeover provision Dummy variable that equals one if a bank is in a state or country enabling anti-takeover provisions ISS CGQ 
CEO total compensation Logarithm of the value of total annual compensation granted to CEO Capital IQ 
CEO options Logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of options granted to CEO to his annual cash ompensation  Capital IQ 
CEO shares Logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of shares granted to CEO to his annual cash ompensation Capital IQ 
CEO portfolio Logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of options and shares granted to CEO to his annual cash 
compensation 
Capital IQ 
CEO delta Logarithm of the CEO’s delta, defined as the dollar value change of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio when the ExecuComp 
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stock price increases by 1%. 
CEO vega Logarithm of the CEO’ vega, defined as the dollar value change of a CEO’s executive’s stock and option portfolio 
when the stock price volatility increases by 1%.  
ExecuComp 
Assets Lorgarithm of total assets BankScope 
Return on  assets Ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets BankScope 
Income shock 
Minus the change in the return on assets if the change in the returns on assets is in the bottom 20% of the 




Table A2. Country coverage 
 
The table provides information on the number of banks per country for which governance and compensation variables are 
available. Specifically, columns 1 and 2 indicate th number of distinct banks per country that are included in regression (1) of 
Table 2 that includes the board independence variable, while columns 3 and 4 indicate the number of distinct banks per country 
that are included in regression (1) of Table 3 thatincludes the CEO options variable. 














Austria 3 0.33 1 0.09 
Australia 10 1.09 15 1.34 
Belgium 6 0.66 3 0.27 
Canada 11 1.20 15 1.34 
Switzerland 6 0.66 23 2.05 
Germany 11 1.20 12 1.07 
Denmark 2 0.22 7 0.62 
Spain 4 0.44 6 0.54 
Finland 1 0.11 4 0.36 
France 3 0.33 11 0.98 
United Kingdom 24 2.63 37 3.30 
Greece 6 0.66 1 0.09 
Hong Kong 14 1.53 17 1.52 
Ireland 4 0.44 3 0.27 
Israel 0 0.00 7 0.62 
Italy 14 1.53 29 2.59 
Japan 66 7.22 3 0.27 
Netherlands 3 0.33 10 0.89 
Norway 2 0.22 14 1.25 
Portugal 3 0.33 2 0.18 
Sweden 5 0.55 7 0.62 
Singapore 6 0.66 1 0.09 
United States 710 77.68 893 79.66 





Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
This paper provides summary statistics for all variables. For variable definitions see Appendix A. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tier 1 capital 5364 0.1188673 0.0392783 0.0003 0.397 
Total capital 5485 0.1368712 0.0365603 0.0007 0.3978 
Common equity 6856 0.0888915 0.045354 0.0004571 0.399141 
Tangible capital  5717 0.07876 0.0446112 0 0.3997 
Market value 6708 0.1219877 0.0686786 0 0.3982863 
Dividends 7045 0.8361959 0.370124 0 1 
Repurchases 7037 0.5833452 0.4930397 0 1 
Payout 7044 0.8838728 0.3204001 0 1 
Net payout 6924 0.7560659 0.4294845 0 1 
Dividend to assets 7002 0.0033658 0.0050477 0 0.0914464 
Repurchase to assets 7035 0.0024998 0.0058447 0 0.0825852 
Payout to assets 7042 0.006001 0.0100387 0 0.1876903 
Net payout to assets 6922 0.0048165 0.0090896 0 0.1862391 
Board independence 3604 3.866815 1.325686 2 6 
Board size 3707 3.100081 0.9861247 1 5 
Board size, effective 3707 2.307526 0.7090921 1 3 
CEO chairman separation 3349 2.227829 0.9273435 1 3 
Anti-takeover provision 3711 0.8905955 0.3121881 0 1 
CEO total compensation 6195 13.24145 1.277642 0 17.480 7 
CEO options 2984 -0.0671694 1.765786 -9.542555 8.200547 
CEO shares 1380 -0.7764621 1.653062 -8.163483 14.743 9 
CEO portfolio 1918 -0.4246851 1.78749 -9.542555 14.74349 
CEO delta 843 4.754275 1.692002 0 9.841147 
CEO vega 678 3.393811 1.615134 0.0054059 7.937679 
Assets 6355 8.364944 2.342639 1.35293 15.12358 
Return on  assets 6817 0.0065276 0.0186397 -0.1991605 0.195753 





Table 2. Bank capitalization ratios and corporate governance, 2004-2008 
 
The dependent variables in columns 1 to 5 are Tier 1 capital, Total capital, Common equity, Tangible capital and 
Market value, respectively. Tier 1 capital is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. Total capital is the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Common equity is the ratio of commn equity to 
total assets. Tangible capital is the ratio of tangible capital to tangible assets. Market value is the market value of 
common equity divided by total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book value of common 
equity. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Return on assets the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. Board 
independence is a variable ranging from 1 to 6, with a higher value indicating a more independent board. Board size 
is a variable ranging from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating a larger board membership. Board size, effective is a 
variable ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating a more effective number of board members. CEO 
chairman separation is a variable ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating better separation between the 
roles of CEO and chairman.  Anti-takeover provision is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is in a state or 
country enabling anti-takeover provisions. Regressions in Panels B-F also include the Lagged assets and L gged 
return on assets variables which are unreported. Regressions include country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 











Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged assets -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged returns on assets 0.747*** 0.695*** 1.445*** 1.144** 2.641*** 
(0.278) (0.257) (0.440) (0.514) (0.868) 
Lagged board independence -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 2131 2207 2429 2289 2384 
adj. R-sq 0.182 0.099 0.257 0.270 0.393 
Panel B 
Lagged board size -0.002 -0.003* 0.003 -0.001 0.005** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 2171 2247 2475 2328 2430 
adj. R-sq 0.201 0.114 0.275 0.276 0.400 
Panel C 
Lagged board size, effective -0.002 -0.002 -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
N 2171 2247 2475 2328 2430 
adj. R-sq 0.200 0.112 0.286 0.281 0.397 
Panel D 
Lagged board size -0.009 -0.012 -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.001 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Lagged board size squared 0.001 0.002 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 2171 2247 2475 2328 2430 
adj. R-sq 0.202 0.116 0.287 0.282 0.401 
Panel E 
Lagged CEO chairman 
separation 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
N 2036 2042 2203 2042 2171 
adj. R-sq 0.187 0.090 0.293 0.373 0.471 
Panel F 
Lagged anti-takeover provision 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.005 -0.013* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
N 2171 2247 2476 2329 2431 
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Table 3. Bank capitalization ratios and executive compensation internationally, 2003-2011 
 
The dependent variables in columns 1 to 5 are Tier 1 capital, Total capital, Common equity, Tangible capital and 
Market value, respectively. Tier 1 capital is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. Total capital is the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Common equity is the ratio of commn equity to 
total assets. Tangible capital is the ratio of tangible capital to tangible assets. Market value is the market value of 
common equity divided by total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book value of common 
equity. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Return on assets the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. CEO total 
compensation is the logarithm of the value of total annual compensation granted to CEO. CEO options is the 
logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of opti ns granted to CEO to his annual cash compensation. CEO 
shares is the logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of shares granted to CEO to his annual cash
compensation. CEO portfolio is the logarithm of theratio of the cumulative value of options and shares granted to 
CEO to his annual cash compensation. Regressions in Panels B-D also include the Lagged assets and Lagged return 
on assets variables which are unreported. Regressions include country-year fixed effects. Information on stock grant 
is recorded in Capital IQ from 2006. The regression in Panel C-D, therefore, cover only the period of 2007-2011. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Tier 1 
capital 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A 
Lagged assets -0.012*** -0.011** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.031*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Lagged returns on assets 0.257** 0.193* 0.462*** 0.352*** 0.575*** 
(0.102) (0.108) (0.123) (0.103) (0.151) 
Lagged CEO total compensation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 4637 4625 5122 5160 4962 
adj. R-sq 0.077 0.069 0.127 0.167 0.625 
Panel B 
Lagged CEO options 0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.001 0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 2414 2407 2701 2514 2648 
adj. R-sq 0.087 0.096 0.059 0.161 0.581 
Panel C 
Lagged CEO shares 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 889 886 981 978 965 
adj. R-sq 0.132 0.137 0.163 0.137 0.323 
Panel D 
Lagged CEO portfolio 0.001* 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 1255 1255 1363 1365 1341 





Table 4. Bank capitalization ratios and executive incentives for the US case, 2003-2011 
 
The dependent variables in columns 1 to 5 are Tier 1 capital, Total capital, Common equity, Tangible capital and 
Market value, respectively. Tier 1 capital is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. Total capital is the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Common equity is the ratio of commn equity to 
total assets. Tangible capital is the ratio of tangible capital to total assets. Market value is the market value of 
common equity divided by total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book value of common 
equity. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Return on assets the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. CEO delta is 
the logarithm of the CEO’s delta, defined as the dollar value change of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio when 
the stock price increases by 1%. CEO vega is the logarithm of the CEO’s vega, defined as the dollar value change of 
a CEO’s stock and option portfolio when the stock price volatility increases by 1%. Regressions include country-
year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Tier 1 capital Total capital Common equity Tangible capital Market value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged assets 0.002 0.006 -0.009 -0.021** -0.046*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
Lagged returns on assets 0.032 0.084 0.426** 0.016 0.649** 
(0.273) (0.268) (0.193) (0.196) (0.267) 
Lagged CEO delta 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.006* 0.007*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Lagged CEO vega -0.009 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006* -0.006** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
N 515 512 652 522 640 
adj. R-sq 0.134 0.135 0.117 0.169 0.686 
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Table 5. Payouts to shareholders of badly performing banks and corporate governance, 2004-2008 
 
The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are Dividends, Repurchases, Payout and Net payout, respectively. Dividends is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
bank pays dividends, and zero otherwise. Repurchases is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank repurchases common shares, and zero otherwise. Payout is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the bank has a positive payout in terms of dividends and repurchases of common shares, and zero otherwise. Net payout is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the bank has a positive payout in terms of dividends and repurchase of common shares net of common share issuance, and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variables in columns 5-8 are Dividends to assets, Repurchases to assets, Payout to assets and Net payout to assets, respectively. 
Dividends to assets is the ratio of dividends to toal assets. Repurchases to assets is the ratio of repurchases of common shares to total assets. Payout to assets is 
the ratio of the sum of dividends and purchases of common shares to total assets. Net payout to asset is the ratio of the sum of dividends and repurchase of 
common shares net of common share issuance to assets if positive, and zero otherwise. Income shock is minus the change in the return on assets if the change in 
the return on assets is in the bottom 20% of the distribution of this variable, and zero otherwise. Board independence is a variable ranging from 1 to 6,with a 
higher value indicating a more independent board. Board size is variable ranging from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating a larger board membership. Board 
size, effective is a variable ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating a more effective number of board members. CEO chairman separation is a vari ble 
ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating better separation between the roles of CEO and chairman. Columns 1-4 show the results of probit model 
estimation, while columns 5-8 show the results of Tbit model estimation. Regressions in Panels B-E also include the Income shock variable which is 
unreported. Regressions include country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectiv ly. 
  Probit Tobit 









Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged Income shock -150.003*** -19.360 -82.445*** -2.887 -0.217** 0.136 -0.071 -0.022 
(50.815) (30.501) (28.505) (13.442) (0.108) (0.186) (0.128) (0.119) 
Lagged Board independence 0.052 0.085** 0.028 0.002 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
(0.058) (0.037) (0.062) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 ) (0.000) 
Lagged Board independence * Lagged 
Income shock 30.736** -1.215 15.452 -4.364 0.034 -0.071 -0.015 0.009 
(14.366) (8.776) (9.577) (4.920) (0.029) (0.053) (0.037) (0.048) 
N 2147 2238 2085 2205 2299 2301 2301 2270 
pseudo R-sq 0.048 0.049 0.043 0.080 -0.015 -0.022 -0.013 -0.018 
Panel B 
Lagged Board size 0.237*** 0.002 0.204*** 0.008 0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.077) (0.046) (0.071) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lagged Board size * Lagged Income 
shock -8.275 -12.248* -6.615 4.862 0.003 -0.030 0.014 0.008 
(9.400) (7.157) (6.187) (3.466) (0.023) (0.051) (0.032) (0.025) 
N 2173 2260 2105 2231 2334 2336 2336 2303 
pseudo R-sq 0.076 0.050 0.081 0.087 -0.016 -0.025 -0.014 -0.019 
Panel C 
Lagged Board size, effective 0.131* 0.029 0.021 0.045 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
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(0.079) (0.059) (0.084) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 ) (0.000) 
Lagged Board size, effective * Lagged 
Income shock -19.213** -3.174 -7.550 -7.096 -0.029 0.038 0.011 0.018 
(8.043) (10.334) (7.877) (5.297) (0.031) (0.095) (0.050) (0.034) 
N 2173 2260 2105 2231 2334 2336 2336 2303 
pseudo R-sq 0.060 0.049 0.065 0.087 -0.016 -0.024 -0.014 -0.019 
Panel D 
Lagged Board size 0.563** 0.094 0.086 0.253 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.281) (0.211) (0.308) (0.246) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged Board size squared -0.056 -0.017 0.022 -0.039 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.046) (0.033) (0.050) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 ) (0.000) 
Lagged Board size * Lagged Income 
shock -18.924 3.300 52.740 1.700 0.080 0.176 0.222* 0.331 
(31.846) (27.967) (52.722) (31.506) (0.076) (0.144) (0.127) (0.222) 
Lagged Board size squared * Lagged 
Income shock 4.458 0.746 -8.866 0.458 -0.009 -0.023 -0.029* -0.045 
(5.086) (3.776) (8.727) (4.253) (0.010) (0.019) (0.017) (0.030) 
N 2228 2316 2160 2231 2390 2392 2392 2303 
pseudo R-sq 0.093 0.051 0.112 0.088 -0.016 -0.025 -0.014 -0.020 
Panel E 
Lagged CEO chairman separation -0.102 -0.047 -0.106 0.022 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 
(0.069) (0.045) (0.067) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 ) (0.000) 
Lagged CEO chairman separation * 
Lagged Income shock 21.531** -7.757 6.140 -9.993 0.029 -0.044 0.007 -0.091* 
(10.558) (10.710) (8.007) (6.683) (0.027) (0.074) (0.043) (0.048) 
N 1872 1962 1859 1938 2038 2040 2040 2011 
pseudo R-sq 0.044 0.042 0.066 0.085 -0.013 -0.029 -0.012 -0.019 
Panel F 
Lagged Anti-takeover provisions 0.626*** 0.178 0.415* 0.578*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001 0.002** 
(0.229) (0.174) (0.227) (0.175) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged Anti-takeover provisions * 
Lagged Income shock 34.573 3.233 25.164 23.572 0.003 0.039 0.037 0.128 
(37.526) (20.968) (20.281) (16.666) (0.087) (0.107) (0.101) (0.087) 
N 2174 2260 2106 2232 2335 2337 2337 2304 






Table 6. Payouts to shareholders of badly performing banks and executive compensation internationally, 2003-2011 
 
The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are Dividends, Repurchases, Payout and Net payout, respectively. Dividends is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
bank pays dividends, and zero otherwise. Repurchases is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank repurchases common shares, and zero otherwise. Payout is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the bank has a positive payout in terms of dividends and repurchases of common shares, and zero otherwise. Net payout is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the bank has a positive payout in terms of dividends and repurchase of common shares net of common share issuance, and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variables in columns 5-8 are Dividends to assets, Repurchases to assets, Payout to assets and Net payout to assets, respectively. 
Dividends to assets is the ratio of dividends to toal assets. Repurchases to assets is the ratio of repurchases of common shares to total assets. Payout to assets is 
the ratio of the sum of dividends and purchases of common shares to total assets. Net payout to asset is the ratio of the sum of dividends and repurchase of 
common shares net of common share issuance to assets if positive, and zero otherwise. Income shock is minus the change in the return on assets if the change in 
the return on assets is in the bottom 20% of the distribution of this variable, and zero otherwise. CEO total compensation is the logarithm of the value of total 
annual compensation granted to CEO. CEO options is the logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of options granted to CEO to his annual cash 
compensation. CEO shares is the logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of shares granted to CEO to his annual cash compensation. CEO portfolio is the 
logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of opti ns and shares granted to CEO to his annual cash compensation. Columns 1-4 show the results of Probit 
model estimation, while columns 5-8 show the results of Tobit model estimation. Information on stock grants is recorded in Capital IQ from 2006. The 
regressions in Panel C-D therefore cover only the period of 2007-2011. Regressions in Panels B-D also include the Income shock variable which is unreported. 
Regressions include country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Probit Tobit 








Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged Income shock -116.703*** -11.170 -104.034*** -64.524*** -0.139 -0.223 -0.194 -0.022 
(41.941) (31.781) (38.923) (31.462) (0.361) (0.274) (0.405) (0.053) 
Lagged CEO total compensation 0.104*** 0.151*** 0.161*** 0.059*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.035) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lagged CEO total compensation * 
Income shock 6.700** 0.542 6.566** 4.134* 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.034 
(3.156) (2.324) (2.789) (2.241) (0.025) (0.020) (0.029) (0.039) 
N 4445 4545 4408 4153 4666 4707 4703 4288 
pseudo R-sq 0.095 0.077 0.109 0.052 -0.022 -0.045 -0.018 -0.020 
Panel B 
Lagged CEO options -0.054* 0.097*** -0.021 -0.092*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.032) (0.025) (0.037) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lagged CEO options * Lagged Income 
shock 13.318** 7.405* 18.929*** 7.445 0.101** 0.052* 0.119** 0.080** 
(5.702) (4.501) (6.927) (5.430) (0.049) (0.030) (0.049) (0.037) 
N 2421 2424 2418 2306 2448 2455 2453 2336 




Lagged CEO shares 0.111** 0.188*** 0.210*** 0.027 0.0 0** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.046) (0.037) (0.049) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lagged CEO shares * Lagged Income 
shock -0.346 1.966 2.801** 2.142 0.001 0.018 -0.026 -0.037 
(2.576) (1.424) (1.360) (1.434) (0.008) (0.015) (0.045) (0.043) 
N 937 937 938 832 922 937 938 832 
pseudo R-sq 0.131 0.106 0.190 0.072 -0.011 -0.032 -0.010 -0.016 
Panel D 
Lagged CEO portfolio 0.095*** 0.172*** 0.178*** 0.09 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.044) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lagged CEO portfolio * Lagged Income 
shock 2.022 1.951 3.486*** 2.791* 0.012 0.019 -0.009 -0.022 
(2.566) (1.364) (1.318) (1.469) (0.008) (0.015) (0.031) (0.033) 
N 1273 1274 1273 1139 1282 1298 1299 1161 






Table 7. Bank capitalization ratios and corporate governance, 2006 
 
The dependent variables in columns 1 to 5 are Tier 1 capital, Total capital, Common equity, Tangible capital and 
Market value, respectively. Tier 1 capital is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. Total capital is the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Common equity is the ratio of commn equity to 
total assets. Tangible capital is the ratio of tangible capital to tangible assets. Market value is the market value of 
common equity divided by total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book value of common 
equity. Assets is the logarithm of total assets. Return on assets the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. Board 
independence is a variable ranging from 1 to 6, with a higher value indicating a more independent board. Board size 
is variable ranging from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating a larger board membership. Board size, eff ctive is a 
variable ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating a more effective number of board members. CEO 
chairman separation is a variable ranging from 1 to 3, with a higher value indicating better separation between the 
roles of CEO and chairman. Anti-takeover provision is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is in a state or 
country enabling anti-takeover provisions. Regressions in Panels B-F also include the Lagged assets and L gged 
return on assets variables which are unreported. Regressions include country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and provided in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 




capital Market value 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged assets -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged returns on assets 0.253 0.295 1.307*** 1.859*** 5.511*** 
(0.572) (0.570) (0.272) (0.357) (1.104) 
Lagged board independence -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
N 459 492 535 487 524 
adj. R-sq 0.206 0.114 0.261 0.312 0.379 
Panel B 
Lagged board size -0.001 -0.002 0.003* -0.001 0.006** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
N 471 504 548 498 537 
adj. R-sq 0.226 0.124 0.306 0.327 0.409 
Panel C 
Lagged board size, effective -0.001 -0.002 -0.009*** -0.004** -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
N 471 504 548 498 537 
adj. R-sq 0.226 0.123 0.325 0.331 0.403 
Panel D 
Lagged board size -0.010 -0.014 -0.027*** -0.014** 0.005 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Lagged board size squared 0.001 0.002 0.005*** 0.002** 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 471 504 548 498 537 
adj. R-sq 0.225 0.126 0.326 0.330 0.408 
Panel E 
Lagged CEO chairman 
separation -0.001 -0.002 -0.003* -0.004** -0.005** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 445 450 480 428 473 
adj. R-sq 0.222 0.098 0.277 0.335 0.385 
Panel F 
Lagged anti-takeover 
provision 0.011** 0.012*** 0.007 0.004 -0.010 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
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N 471 504 548 498 537 





Table 8. Bank capitalization ratios and executive compensation internationally, 2006 
 
The dependent variables in columns 1 to 5 are Tier 1 capital, the Total capital, Common equity, Tangible capital and 
Market value, respectively. Tier 1 capital is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. Total capital is the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Common equity is the ratio of commn equity to 
total assets. Tangible capital is the ratio of tangible capital to total assets. Market value is the market value of 
common equity divided by total assets plus market value of common equity minus book value of common equity. 
Assets is the lorgarithm of total assets. Return on assets the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. CEO total 
compensation is the logarithm of the value of total annual compensation granted to CEO. CEO options is the 
logarithm of the ratio of the cumulative value of opti ns granted to CEO to his annual cash compensation. 
Regressions in Panel B also include the Lagged assets and Lagged return on assets variables which are unreported. 
Regressions include country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level, and 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A 
Lagged assets -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Lagged returns on assets 0.322 0.185 1.234*** 0.976** 2.534*** 
(0.299) (0.301) (0.303) (0.470) (0.530) 
Lagged CEO total 
compensation 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.016*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
N 583 585 622 555 603 
adj. R-sq 0.155 0.064 0.220 0.238 0.261 
Panel B 
Lagged CEO options -0.004*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 0.004** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
N 430 431 453 383 445 





Figure 1. This figure displays the unweighted yearly mean 
of Tier 1 capital, which is the ratio of Tier 1 capit l to risk 
weighted assets.  
 
Figure 2. This figure displays the unweighted yearly mean 
of Total capital, which is the ratio of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 




Figure 3. This figure displays the unweighted yearly mean 
of common equity, which is the ratio of the book value of 
common equity to total assets.  
 
Figure 5. This figure displays the unweighted yearly mean 
of market value, which is the market value of common 
equity divided by total assets plus the market value of 
common equity minus the book value of common equity.  
 
Figure 4. This figure displays the unweighted yearly mean 
of tangible capital, which is the ratio of tangible capital to 
tangible assets.  
 
 
Figure 6. This figure displays the unweighted yearly 



















































































































Figure 7. This figure displays the unweighted yearly 




Figure 8. This figure displays the unweighted yearly 
average ratio of total payout (dividends plus repurchases) to 
total assets.  
 
Figure 9. This figure displays the unweighted yearly 
average ratio of the payout net of private stock issuance to 
total assets. The value is negative when issuance exceeds 






Figure 10. The figure displays the fraction of banks that 
experienced income shocks over time. An income shock is 
defined as the change in returns of assets is in the bottom 
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